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COULD TERRORISTS DERAIL A PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION?
Jerry H. Goldfeder *
Whereas postponing an election in the aftermath of a terrorist attack
would demonstrate weakness, not strength, and would be interpreted as a
victory for the terrorists . . . . Resolved, That it is the sense of the House
of Representatives that . . . the actions of terrorists will never cause the
date of any presidential election to be postponed . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION
While the 2004 United States presidential election was held without the
terrorist attack that many people feared, as election day approached, a
gnawing feeling gripped lawyers working on behalf of President Bush and
Senator Kerry. 2 After all, this was the first U.S. presidential election since
the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, and the train
bombing in Madrid several days before Spain’s own national election was
fresh in their minds. 3 Legal issues had to be researched; plans had to be
made. Unfortunately, there appears to have been very little planning for
this possibility. 4
Although scholars from the Washington D.C.-based American
Enterprise Institute have addressed some of the repercussions a terrorist

*

The author teaches election law as an Adjunct Professor at Fordham University School of
Law. He has practiced election law in New York since his admission to the bar in 1980.
Professor Goldfeder received his J.D. from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University, in 1979, where he served on the Law Review, and his M.A. in political
science from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1972.
1. H.R. 728, 108th Cong. (2004). The Resolution passed 419-2.
2. E.g., Robert Block, What if . . . Could the Federal Election be Postponed?, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 26, 2004, at B1.
3. E.g., Keith B. Richburg, Madrid Train Blast Kills at Least 190; 10 Bombs Detonate
Almost at Once, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1.
4. Steven F. Huefner, Assistant Professor of Law at Moritz College of Law of Ohio
State University, attempted to raise awareness of the problem. See Withstanding election
day Terrorism, at http://www.moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/elections_pres02.html (last
visited May 29, 2005).
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attack would have on presidential succession,5 there appears not to have
been even a “white paper” published by Congress or any agency of the
executive department of the United States government relating to the
impact of an attack during or immediately preceding a presidential election.
On one hand, this lack of planning is understandable: elections in the
United States, even presidential elections, are held and regulated by states
and municipalities. 6 The federal government, aside from several roles
mandated by the Constitution and a limited number of statutes, plays
almost no role in conducting our nation’s elections. 7 Thus, there is no
standing agency that normally studies or regulates the administration of
elections. 8 On the other hand, it is unfathomable that after the September
11 attacks—which occurred during a mayoral primary election in New
York City—neither Congress nor the executive branch acted to safeguard
regularly scheduled elections, including that of president.
This failure is especially appalling considering the response to the World
Trade Center attack was to cancel the election in progress. Not once in our
nation’s history has a presidential election been canceled or postponed—for
any reason, including during the civil war—but, somehow, the idea of
ensuring that no enemy would prevent the disruption of the 2004 election
was entertained for only a fleeting moment, but never implemented.9 We
may have dodged a bullet last year, but the problem has not disappeared.
This Essay will explore the authority of the United States Congress to
rectify this substantial hole in our nation’s constitutional system. Given the
state-driven regulation of American elections, I will first explore how
5. See generally John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, If Terrorists Attacked Our
Presidential Elections, 3 ELECTION L.J. 597 (2004); Christopher Lee, A Scenario Where
Doubts Linger; Despite Plans, Some Doubt Government’s Ability to Provide Services in
Emergency, WASH. POST, June 22, 2004, at A15.
6. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). “[T]he States have evolved
comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in most substantial
ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding
primary and general elections, the registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection
and qualification of candidates.” Id.
7. See Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 568 (6th Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (noting that the states are the primary regulators of federal, state, and
local elections) (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 730); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
29 (1968).
8. There are two notable exceptions: the Federal Election Commission polices
campaign finance, see 2 U.S.C. § 437c (2005) (establishing the Federal Election
Commission and granting it the power to regulate the financing of presidential election
campaigns), and the Department of Justice monitors compliance with the Voting Rights Act,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2005).
9. See generally Could November Election be Delayed?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 12,
2004, at 4 (reporting that U.S. Homeland Security Officials were considering ways to delay
the election in the event of a terrorist attack).
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various states and municipalities have responded to extraordinary
circumstances on or immediately before an election. This has occurred
infrequently, but often enough to reveal that state law is woefully
ambiguous as to how governmental agencies or elected officials may
respond to such emergencies. Because I am predominantly concerned
about presidential elections, I will also look at how federal law affects this
“doomsday scenario.” Finally, I will recommend what the United States
Congress can—and should—do.

I. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
The nature of the problem becomes apparent by examining the
governmental response to the extraordinary attack on September 11. It was
Primary Election Day across New York State, including a Democratic party
primary for mayor of the City of New York, other city-wide and boroughwide offices, and fifty-one City Council seats. The polls opened at 6 a.m.,
and were scheduled to remain open until 9 p.m. The attack, which began at
8:46 a.m. and ultimately destroyed the Twin Towers, rendered several
polling places located near the World Trade Center dangerous and
inaccessible. Amidst the unprecedented turmoil that grew throughout the
city that horrific morning, decisions about the pending election had to be
made.
At about 9:15 a.m., the Executive Director of the New York City Board
of Elections attempted to reach Governor Pataki, but could not locate
him. 10 In the meantime, the Board of Elections counsel contacted New
York Supreme Court Justice Steven Fisher, who had been appointed
several weeks earlier by the state’s Office of Court Administration to
supervise the 2001 New York City elections. Judge Fisher issued an Order
canceling the election. 11 Eventually, the Governor was found, and he then
10. As campaign counsel to Mark Green, a leading candidate (and eventual Democratic
party nominee) for Mayor in the September 11 primary election, the author, upon learning
that the second Tower was hit, called the Executive Director of the New York City Board of
Elections, Daniel De Francesco. Mr. De Francesco advised the author that he had earlier
placed a call to the Governor’s office, but was told that the Governor’s whereabouts were
not known. Telephone conversation with Daniel De Francesco, Executive Director, New
York City Board of Elections (Sept. 11, 2001).
11. See Joel Siegel, Mayoral Primary’s Not Even Secondary: Elections Indefinitely
Postponed, DAILY NEWS (New York), Sept. 12, 2001, at 59. Counsel for the four candidates
competing in the Democratic party primary election for mayor, including the author, as well
as representatives of good-government groups, and the bi-partisan New York City Board of
Elections, had been meeting regularly for approximately six months prior to the September
11 primary. The goal was to avoid, or at least minimize, the kinds of procedural
irregularities that occurred during the previous year’s presidential election. This
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issued an Executive Order suspending the election in light of the obvious
emergency. 12
Whether Justice Fisher had the authority to cancel the municipal
elections is open to question, but no one challenged his order on that day or
afterward. He defended his action on the ground that the polling places
were no longer fully staffed by Board of Elections personnel and police, as
required by law. 13 Thus, as a result of police abandoning their election
posts for the World Trade Center, procedural safeguards for the election
disappeared. 14
Whether the Governor could simply have issued an Executive Order
canceling the election is also uncertain. Ignoring the specific provision of
the election law that addressed postponing a vote during a disaster,15
Governor Pataki relied upon plenary powers to temporarily suspend the
election. 16 He halted primaries statewide, although the disruption was
centered in New York City and there was no evidence that voting could not
proceed in the rest of the state. 17 In the aftermath of the attacks, the
Governor’s action was, like Justice Fisher’s, officially unchallenged.
Despite the lack of clarity provided by New York law and the
questionable legality of the executive and judicial responses to the election
crisis caused by the attack, the New York legislature, like the United States
Congress, has not enacted any statutory protections in anticipation of future
attacks. Put another way, although the trauma was probably the single
most important reason that normally litigious New York election lawyers
did not challenge the Governor’s wholesale cancellation of the election
throughout the state, these scarring events did not sufficiently command the

extraordinarily cooperative effort resulted in an agreement whereby the New York State
Office of Court Administration, the body that administers the judiciary in the state, would
appoint a judge to directly supervise election issues in order to resolve procedural
difficulties expeditiously. Supreme Court Justice Steven Fisher was so appointed. See
Siegel, supra.
12. N.Y. COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.113 (2001).
13. Dahlia Lithwick, How Do You Cancel an Election?, SLATE, Sept. 12, 2001, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/1008278 (last visited May 29, 2005).
14. See id.
15. The election law states that such a postponement is to be determined by a county or
state board of elections. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-108 (McKinney 2005).
16. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2005). “[T]he governor may by executive
order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute, local law, [or] ordinance . . .
during a state disaster emergency if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder
or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster.” Id.
17. Adam Nagourney, A Day of Terror: The Elections; Pataki Orders Postponement of
Primaries Across State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A8. “Primaries were being held in
most of the 62 counties in New York . . . .” Id.
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attention of New York public officials to enact more suitable legislation. 18
Consequently, were another extraordinary event to prompt cancellation
of an election in New York State, there would still be absolutely no
statutory guidance as to the practical questions that might ensue. For
instance, could a mayor or town supervisor act on his own to call off a local
election without the blessing of the governor? Would votes already cast
before disaster struck be counted, or would those voters be allowed to vote
on the postponed election day? 19 Does either the New York State Board of
Elections or the New York City Campaign Finance Board, the
governmental agency that regulates public matching funds for New York
City municipal candidates, have the authority to alter contribution and
expenditure limits as a result of an unanticipated expanded election
season? 20 If some voting records were destroyed, would “same-day
registration” be permitted so that voters would not be disenfranchised?21

II. HOW STATES HAVE ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM
Although states are the primary regulators of elections, they have not
been diligent in enacting appropriate prophylactic statutes for emergency
situations. The emergency need not be a terrorist attack; after all, there
have been floods, snowstorms, hurricanes, and electrical outages that have
crippled cities from time to time. Several of the largest states—California,

18. Jill Gardiner, Extra Security Likely at Polls, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 2, 2004, at 1. After
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), it is not clear whether New York retains the “dubious
distinction of generating half the country’s election litigation.” Gardiner, supra.
19. The votes cast on the morning of September 11 were nullified. Those voters were
able to cast another ballot at the postponed election two weeks later. This decision was
announced on September 13, 2001 by Governor Pataki and the state’s legislative leaders.
Their press release stated, inter alia:
Under the legislation agreed to by the Governor and the Legislature, the new
primary elections will take place on September 25, 2001. Any votes cast on
September 11th will not be counted, but all absentee ballots duly and properly cast
will continue to be valid and will be counted.
Press Release, Office of the Governor of the State of New York, Governor, Legislature
Announce New Primary Election Date (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/year01/sept13_4_01.htm.
20. The New York City Campaign Finance Board, which oversees municipal candidates
who have “opted in” to the public matching funds program, decided, from its makeshift
office after its regular downtown quarters were rendered unusable by the Trade Center
attack, that no candidate could spend any money on campaigning from September 11 to the
new primary day, two weeks later. New York City Campaign Finance Board Advisory
Opinion 2001-12 (Sept. 20, 2001).
21. See Fortier and Ornstein, Ballot Box Needs Some Backup Against Terrorism, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at B11.
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Texas, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Michigan for example—have no election
emergency statutes, but rather general “state of emergency” provisions,
similar to the one invoked by the Governor in New York in September
2001, allowing him to suspend New York law. 22
But plenary executive powers do not provide the kind of guidance
necessary to decide when or how to postpone an election. For instance,
should there be a rule (or a rule of thumb) to call off an election when an
attack occurs before election day? How long before election day must the
attack occur, and what kind of circumstances must occur to call it off?
Must a certain percentage of polling sites become inoperative for an
election to be canceled? And, given the fact that many of the states’
election officials are partisan, and many elections for state or city executive
positions are hotly contested, it is not an academic question as to who
should make these decisions.
If an attack or disaster occurs on election day, as occurred on September
11 in New York, may those who have already voted either in person or by
mail be permitted to cast another vote on the new election day? After all, if
there is an attack, there is no question that the dynamic and important
issues of the campaign will have been dramatically altered.23 On the other
hand, if a voter has chosen to mail in an absentee ballot, would it be fair to
allow her to vote a second time? Here, the voter makes the choice to vote
in advance of election day, and even in ordinary elections, events often
change the campaign dynamic in the last few days of a race. Thus, why
should someone who has chosen to vote early get a second chance?
If there is an attack in one part of a jurisdiction, say New York City, and
there is a statewide election, why should voters in an unaffected area, such
as Buffalo, be prevented from casting their ballots after the attack? And, in
this example, if there is a statewide election and the election is postponed
in only part of the state, should the state or municipality ensure that the
votes already cast remain uncanvassed until the resumed election is
complete?
Furthermore, if an election is canceled, would the incumbent officeholders retain their positions beyond the constitutional or statutory
terms? 24 And, if so, under what authority?
22. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8571 (West 2005); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3305/7 (2005);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 30.405 (2005); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1) (2005); TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 418.016 (Vernon 2005). Two states, Ohio and New Jersey, have no
emergency protection legislation at all.
23. See, e.g., Philip Lentz, Election Day Attack On NY Unmakes Mayor Green; Sept. 11
Events Cast Giuliani as a Hero, Transfer His Aura to Free-Spending Mike, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUS., Mar. 4, 2002, at 9.
24. After September 11, the term-limited Mayor Rudolph Giuliani proposed that his
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In short, there are serious questions for election lawyers, elected officials
and the public to ponder. Generalized emergency statutes offer no
guidance, yet four years after the worst attack on our country, no state has
any particularized procedures in place to address these practical and serious
issues. This is not to say that states have not been able to deal with
extraordinary circumstances when the need has arisen. Given the fact,
however, that elections by their nature are often quite contentious, it is not
surprising that in the few instances where an exercise of generalized
powers has been invoked to postpone an election, there have been
challenges to such actions in the courts.
In the New York 2001 example, the authority to cancel the election
statewide was dubious, but the magnitude and shock of the attack probably
discouraged anyone from challenging the Governor’s order. 25 Historically,
this is anomalous. During the past sixty years, there have been few
instances of an election having been postponed, but such postponements
brought court challenges. Reported cases of challenges to these actions
demonstrate that courts applied flexible, pragmatic approaches, interpreting
plenary statutory authority liberally and deferring to executive decisionmaking in the face of extraordinary circumstances.
A. Lewiston, Maine, 1952
In February, 1952, the City of Lewiston, Maine, pursuant to its city
charter, 26 scheduled an election on the third Monday of the month for the
offices of Mayor and members of the Board of Alderman. No election was
held on that day, February 18, however, because the city was experiencing

second four-year term of office, set to expire on December 31, 2001, continue an additional
three months. Democratic front-runner Mark Green supported the idea; Fernando Ferrer, his
opponent in the Democratic primary run-off election, opposed it. As a result, Green’s
previous strong support among white liberals who had fought Giuliani’s policies during the
previous eight years withered, permitting Green to only squeak out a victory over Ferrer.
See id.
25. As mayoral candidate Mark Green’s campaign lawyer, the author was familiar with
the major actors in that election. To his knowledge, no effort was made to challenge the
postponement of the primary election from September 11 to September 25. On the contrary,
the postponement developed from a general consensus: in the afternoon and evening of the
day of the attack, and during the next day or so, government officials, Board of Election
personnel, and campaign personnel discussed how to reschedule the primary. Initial talks
focused on a two-day postponement. Ultimately, considering the extent of the damage, the
deep shock in the city, and the intervening Jewish High Holy Days, a two-week
postponement was accepted by all players as reasonable. Not surprisingly, this consensus
was reached rather quickly.
26. Art. II, § 1 of Chap. 8 of the Private and Special Laws of Maine 1939, amended by
Ch. 86 of Private and Special Laws 1943.

GOLDFEDERCHRISTENSEN

108

2/3/2011 10:03 PM

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXII

the “most severe blizzard in a period of sixty years.” 27 The storm started
the day before
and had so increased in severity by 8 a.m. on February 18, when the polls
were to be opened, that all of the walks, streets and ways in the city were
not passable by pedestrian or vehicle. Access to the polling places was
impossible because of the storm. Wardens and ward clerks for most of
the polling places were unable to report for duty at any time during the
voting period between 8 a.m. and 7 p.m. The continued efforts of the city
clerk during the day to obtain the presence of legal voters in most of the
polling places . . . met with little success because voters were unable to
get to the polling places. The city clerk himself found it impossible to
deliver ballots to polling places. All transportation utilities throughout the
city were unable to operate. Approximately three feet of snow, with drifts
of greater depth, made industry, business, schools, and the opening of
State, County, and Town offices impossible for the day. . . . By reason of
this “snow-bound” condition that existed during all of February 18, 1952,
no votes were cast at any polling place, although the number of registered
voters in the city was 21,252. No election was, or could be, held because
of the unprecedented storm. 28

As a result, “municipal officers” of Lewiston called off the February 18
election—which, of course, had been effectively “nullified” by mother
nature—and then gave notice for a re-scheduled election one week later, on
February 25, 1952. 29
The re-scheduled election was held, and 13,100 votes were cast. 30 No
mayoral candidate received a majority, thus requiring, pursuant to the city
charter, a run-off election on the first Monday in March. 31 Accordingly, on
March 3, Roland L. Marcotte was elected mayor, and on March 17, he and
the duly elected Aldermen were sworn in and took office. 32
On behalf of the State of Maine, Attorney General Alexander A. LeFleur
commenced an action in quo warranto, questioning Mayor Marcotte and
his colleagues’ authority to act as city officials on the ground that the

27. State v. Marcotte, 89 A.2d 308, 309 (Me. 1952).
28. Id.
29. Id. The court did not identify the “municipal officers” who made the decision to
postpone the election and it is not clear that the same decision would have been made if fifty
or one hundred voters had made it to the polls. Presumably, because the blizzard brought
the city to a near stand-still, a few votes would not have made a difference. In that case,
however, the court would have had to grapple with the issue of how to handle the votes that
had been cast.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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February 25 election was invalid.33 Apparently having original jurisdiction
in the matter, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine dismissed the claim by
the Attorney General, holding that the election was properly canceled and
re-scheduled. Thus, the results of the re-scheduled elections were lawful,
and the successful candidates could assume their respective public offices.
The Marcotte court reasoned that, absent “fault, mistake, carelessness,
fraud, or design” to prevent the originally scheduled election, it would read
the provision in the City Charter designating the third Monday in February
as election day as “directory” rather than mandatory. 34 The court noted
that the 1952 storm was “of such unusual proportions and such unexpected
violence that it might well be considered that there was no election due to
‘an act of God.’” 35 Furthermore, there was neither constitutional nor
statutory prohibition of a rescheduled election.36 Thus, an election could
be canceled in the event of an “unavoidable circumstance” such as the
blizzard experienced by the people of Lewiston, and a new election day
could be scheduled, 37 making the postponed election for mayor and
Aldermen of the city of Lewiston valid.38

33. Id. at 308. Quo warranto proceedings are now abolished in Maine. See Lund ex rel.
Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554, 558 n.1 (Me. 1973).
34. See Marcotte, 89 A.2d at 311-12. There is support for this holding in the case law of
other states. See generally State ex rel. Sisson v. Felkner, 336 S.W.2d 419, 421-22 (Mo.
1960) (holding that although time and place are generally considered “of the substance of an
election,” many statutory provisions pertaining to such matters have been expressly held to
be or treated as “directory,” at least “where the person or body charged with the duty of
calling or holding the election has failed or refused to do so”); Rainwater v. State ex rel.
Strickland, 187 So. 484 (Ala. 1939). Rainwater is often cited authoritatively for the
proposition that even “fixed” election dates are “directory,” permitting officials to postpone
voting under certain circumstances:
While it must be conceded that time, place and qualified electorate are the
essential elements of a valid election, and that statutes specifying the date of
holding an election are regarded ordinarily, as mandatory, nevertheless, we find
many well considered authorities holding that statutes providing for periodical
elections in municipalities are merely directory.
Rainwater, 187 So. at 486.
35. Id. at 312.; see also 6 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 319 (2004) (describing the
standards that a casualty or phenomenon must reach to qualify as an act of God).
36. Id.
37. Marcotte, 89 A.2d at 311.
38. Interestingly, the Attorney General, who brought the quo warranto proceeding,
argued to the court that the municipal officers had no authority to reschedule the Lewiston
election. See Marcotte, 89 A.2d at 311. He conceded, however, that a court of competent
jurisdiction “might have compelled the officers to call a later election.” Id. The court
rejected this argument, stating that, “It seems somewhat inconsistent that where no election
is held due to an excusable mistake, or by an unavoidable circumstance, that the date of a
later election may only be fixed by the Court in mandamus, although the officials are
willing to act.” Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Washington County, Pennsylvania, 1985
During the statewide election in Pennsylvania on November 5, 1985,
rainy weather caused flooding along the Monongahela River in Washington
County. 39 The county’s election commissioners declared a state of
emergency, and the governor proclaimed Washington County a disaster
area. 40 At the request of the election board, the county’s specially
designated election judge, President Judge Gladden, suspended the election
without conducting a hearing. 41 As a result of Judge Gladden’s order, polls
were closed in eleven election precincts “because of a state of ‘emergency’
created by extreme weather conditions that caused extensive flooding, loss
of electricity, heat and water.”42 The election in these eleven precincts was
re-scheduled for two weeks later.43 A notice was sent out, but it did not
“list the names of candidates vying for the various offices and failed to
include the office of county controller as an office being contested.”44
After the election, Patricia Beharry, the victorious controller, sought to
reverse the orders of the election judge despite its lack of affect on her
successful candidacy. 45 Ms. Beharry claimed, inter alia, that the Court of
Common Pleas did not have authority to suspend the election in
Washington County’s eleven precincts; that doing so violated federal and
state constitutional due process protections; and, in failing to specify the
offices being contested, that the court violated the publication requirements
for special elections.46 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania rejected
these claims. 47
The court noted that neither the Pennsylvania Constitution nor the state’s
election code “expressly provides any procedure to follow when a natural
disaster creates an emergency situation that interferes with an election.”48

39. See In re General Election—1985, 531 A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. 1987).
40. Id.
41. In Pennsylvania, state law provides that each county has assigned to it an “Election
Judge” for the purpose of administering the election and resolving issues that come before
it. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3046 (2004).
42. General Election, 89 A.2d at 838. Election judges in nearby counties chose not to
close the polls assigned to them, casting doubt on the severity of the emergency. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 839.
45. See id. at 838 (holding that the controller had standing to sue despite her victory,
which was unaffected by the rescheduled election date).
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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The court was satisfied, however, that the state Election Code provided the
election judge with authority to reschedule elections when “members of the
electorate could be deprived of their opportunity to participate because of
circumstances beyond their control, such as a natural disaster, and this
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the election laws.”49
The court further said that it would have been more desirable if the
notices announcing the rescheduled election day had listed the names of
candidates vying for the various positions, but held that this was not a
“special election” under the code, and, therefore, the notice was not
required to contain this information.50 Petitioner’s due process arguments
were also rejected on the grounds that, “[w]ithout the court’s action, some
voters, by reason of the elements, would have incurred the discrimination
of disenfranchisement.” 51
Finally, the court dismissed petitioner’s contention that the election
judge “should have voided the entire county election and ordered the
holding of an entirely new election countywide.” 52 This argument,
although unsuccessful in the Pennsylvania case, raises two issues of general
importance—one relating to voter eligibility, the other to canvassing. First,
if voting must be postponed in some precincts, should voters in all
precincts be able to cast their ballots on the postponed election day, even
those who had already voted? If they are not permitted to vote again, is it
fair to say that they have been disenfranchised in an election whose issues
might be different than when they had originally cast their ballots? On the
other hand, if they can vote on the postponed date, are not they given an
unfair opportunity to vote twice? Second, if those who have already voted
may not vote on the new election day, should election officials canvass the
votes already cast prior to the postponed election day? If votes in
unaffected areas are canvassed, might not those partial results affect the
subsequent turnout and balloting in precincts where the voting had been
postponed? The court did not address these exigencies, but it did limit the
precedential effect of its decision, saying that “the remedy which the
[lower] court applied in this case is not the proper one for all situations; . .
.[but that] the court’s approach was a reasonable one in the circumstances

49. Id. (citing 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3046 (2004), stating that on election day, “the court
of common pleas of each county or a judge thereof” could make decisions about “matters
pertaining to the election as may be necessary to carry out the intent of this act.”).
50. Id. (noting that special elections are held to fill vacancies in specific offices, which
was not the case in this election).
51. Id.
52. Id. (holding that such a drastic remedy was not called for under the circumstances
presented to the court).
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of this case.” 53
In the Maine and Pennsylvania cases, therefore, the courts applied a
flexible, common sense approach. Statutes that provided generalized
powers to election officials were interpreted broadly, and the courts
inferred good faith by the actors involved. Because the suspension of
voting and the subsequent rescheduling of election days did not appear to
have any impact on the results of the elections, the courts had the luxury of
rendering their respective decisions in the absence of outcomedeterminative litigation. It is an obviously open question whether the
Pennsylvania court’s analysis and ruling would have been the same if the
votes from the eleven precincts in Washington County were dispositive in
the county controller’s race.
This question underscores why the
Pennsylvania court insisted that its holding be narrowly construed.
Similarly, in Marcotte, the court was not presented with a claim that the
election’s cancellation benefited or harmed any candidate; after all, the
blizzard was overwhelming, total, and unambiguous. A less devastating
storm, affecting only parts of the city, might very well have raised a host of
questions, such as the ones raised above. Fortunately for the parties and the
courts, however, those issues were not extant.
C. Maryland, 1988
In January 1988, the Office of the Attorney General of the State of
Maryland received an inquiry from Gene Raynor, the state administrator of
elections, concerning the upcoming primary, scheduled for March 8, 1988.
Raynor sought a formal opinion from the Attorney General “concerning the
procedures to be followed by local boards of election in the event that
severely inclement weather interferes with the operations of polling places
on election day.” 54 The request was prompted by the “concern of local
election officials that a snow storm might cause havoc on March 8, the
unusually early date set for this year’s primary election.” 55
The Attorney General replied:
Inclement weather ordinarily would not be a reason for any change in the
conduct of the election. Neither the State Administrative Board of
Election Laws nor any local election board has the power to alter the date
or times prescribed by law for an election, on grounds of bad weather or
for any other reason. However, if weather conditions were so severe that
a substantial number of polling places in one or more jurisdiction [sic]

53. Id. at 840.
54. 73 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 136 (1988).
55. Id.
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could not open, the Governor has the power to declare a state of
emergency and suspend the provision of the Election Code that mandates
the conduct of the primary election on March 8. Alternatively, a local
election board might petition the circuit court of a county adversely
affected by weather conditions to reschedule the election in that
jurisdiction, but the court’s authority to take that action is uncertain. 56

In reaching his conclusion, the Attorney General reviewed the state’s
Election Code, the emergency powers of the governor, and the
Pennsylvania flooding case, In re General Election—1985. 57 He noted that
the Election Code prescribed the exact date and time in which the election
should take place and found no provision in the Code that dealt expressly
with the “adversities of inclement weather”58 or that allowed for any
change of election day, although he cited circumstances where electrical
storms caused temporary power outages, leading local election officials to
arrange for emergency lighting. 59
On the other hand, the Attorney General said that the governor had the
power to proclaim a state of emergency and that, in such circumstances, he
may “[s]uspend the provisions of any statute, or of any rule or regulation of
any State or local agency.” 60 Thus, the governor “could suspend the
provision of the Election Code mandating the March 8 primary date.”61
Such postponement, however, would trigger a “duty to direct alternative
arrangements in lieu of the suspended provision, in order to achieve the
objective of the suspended statute.” 62
Finally, the Attorney General advised that local boards of elections,
rather than relying upon a governor who may or may not choose to exercise
his or her general powers, might opt to seek relief directly from the courts.
In providing a context for this possibility, he referenced In re General
Election—1985, and distinguished Maryland’s election law from
Pennsylvania’s, which, unlike the former, contains an express provision for
judicial oversight of elections; 63 Maryland’s law, however, did grant
authority to the courts to redress acts or omissions relating to an election.
Considering that provision, the Attorney General acknowledged the
possibility that a court might have the power to postpone an election

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at n.1 (noting that voting machines do not operate electronically).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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because of adverse conditions, but stopped short of endorsing that
interpretation. 64
In issuing his Opinion, the Maryland Attorney General was being
appropriately conservative in his interpretation of state law. Perhaps he
would have felt more comfortable about a court’s powers had State v.
Marcotte been brought to his attention. 65 The Maine statutory code
considered by the Marcotte court resembled Maryland’s—with its lack of
an express judicial oversight provision—more than Pennsylvania’s.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Marcotte court exercised its authority to
review the postponement of an election during an emergency.
The Attorney General’s cautious response to the inquiry seems neither
surprising nor inappropriate, considering the hypothetical question raised
about the exercise of power in the face of emergency conditions. That said,
his view is additional evidence of the inherent problems when there is an
absence of clearly articulated election procedures during extraordinary
circumstances.
III. THE FEDERAL CONTEXT
I have been addressing the limited circumstances where highly unusual
exigencies have prompted a state or municipality to cancel an election and
reschedule it for a later time. Considering their infrequency, the
opportunities for judicial gloss on the actions taken have been scarce. The
analysis employed, and the lessons to be drawn in the context of a federal
election, however, are somewhat different than we have seen in state or
municipal elections. Yet, the central point of the relevant history and
jurisprudence is the same: just as a state or municipal election date has been
found to be directory rather than mandatory, a federal election’s date is
similarly not constitutionally fixed or incapable of being altered under
certain conditions. The significance of this, of course, is that the United
States Congress can, if the need arises, postpone federal election day.
A. Historical Perspective
Until the 1840s, the states conducted federal elections pursuant to their
own regulations. 66 In the early days of the republic, some states appointed

64. See id.
65. Given the text of his opinion, it is fair to infer that State v. Marcotte was not brought
to his attention.
66. See Voting Integrity Project v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001):
Until the 1840s, Congress left the actual conduct of federal elections to the
diversity of state arrangements. In 1845, Congress provided that in presidential
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presidential electors by popular vote and others did so through legislative
action, and did so at different times. 67 The various methods employed by
the states obviously played a role in the campaigns undertaken by
candidates for president. 68 Likewise, candidates for the House of
Representative were voted upon at different times in the several states,
sometimes in different months.
These practices were reformed by Congress in 1845, when the day for
election of presidential electors was also standardized, 69 and again in 1872,
when the day for election of members of the House of Representative was
made uniform. 70 Congressional debate regarding these proposals reveals
the importance of uniform election days. During the 1844 debate on the
election of the electoral college, Congress “considered and rejected the
practice of multi-day voting [which was then] allowed by some states.”71
In Virginia, for example, “‘it frequently happened that all the votes were
not polled in one day.’” 72 Advocates for reform strenuously argued that the
“time must be uniform in the States” so as not replicate the “great frauds”
that had allegedly occurred in the previous presidential election.73
Similarly, in the 1871-72 Congressional debates, multi-day voting was
addressed explicitly, and rejected once again. “[T]he anarchy and terrorism
resulting from massive voting fraud in ‘Bleeding Kansas’ by pro-slavery
voters from Missouri crossing the [Kansas] border to counter pro-abolition
voters from New England” 74 was fresh in the minds of many in Congress.
Thus, a strong push for a uniform election day for representatives came
from a desire to prevent “throwing voters across from one [state] into the
other.” 75

election years “[t]he electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed,
in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November.” Further
changes for the election of Representatives, Senators, and the President and Vice
President were legislated as part of Reconstruction in the 1870s.
Id.
67. See RICHARD J. ELLIS, FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 118 (1999).
Massachusetts, the extreme example, employed seven systems of selecting electors in the
first ten presidential elections. Id.
68. See JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800, at
156 (2004).
69. See generally 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2005).
70. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2005).
71. Voting Integrity Project v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001).
72. Id. at 1172 n.27 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1844)).
73. Id. at 1172-73 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1844)).
74. Id. (quoting ALBERT D. RICHARDSON, BEYOND THE MISSISSIPPI: FROM THE GREAT
RIVER TO THE GREAT OCEAN 41 (1967)).
75. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1871)).
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On the other hand, “concern was expressed about the inconvenience of
changing state constitutions and laws to accommodate a uniform national
day.” 76 The difficult logistics of same-day voting provided added weight
for its opponents, who claimed that “‘[i]t is an impossibility for the voters
to all get together on one day [because] they are remote from the polls.’”77
Despite the critics, same day voting won out, with no accommodations to
states then employing the practice of multiple-day voting.

B. The Louisiana Open Primary
One hundred years after Congress required all states to vote for members
of Congress on the same day, Louisiana created an “open primary” for
Congressional elections. In the month of October, all candidates—
regardless of party—would appear on a single ballot, and all voters would
vote. If a candidate received a majority of the vote, that person won the
congressional seat and there would be no vote held in November. 78 If no
candidate received a majority, the top two vote-getters would take part in a
run-off in November, on “federal election day.” 79
A group of Louisiana voters challenged the procedure in federal court.
After a dismissal at the district court level, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the relevant election law unconstitutional.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 80 The issue before the Court in
Foster was whether the Louisiana election scheme complied with the
federal statute mandating a uniform election day for the election of
Representatives to Congress and United States Senators. Pursuant to the
Elections Clause of the United States Constitution, “[t]he Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senator and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” 81 Thus, the Elections
Clause “is a default provision; it invests the States with responsibility for
the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress
declines to preempt state legislative choices.” 82 As noted above, Congress
had in fact acted, and set the date of the biennial election as the Tuesday

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 138-39 (1871)).
Id. at 1174 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3408 (1872)).
See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997).
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
Foster, 522 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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after the first Monday in November. 83
The issue raised in Foster was not purely an academic matter: from
1978, when Louisiana’s October open primary law went into effect, until
the statute was challenged in Foster almost twenty years later, a run-off
election had been held on federal election day in only nine of the fiftyseven contested elections for United States Representative and in only one
Senate race. 84 Considering the meaning of “election,” the Court ruled that
a contested election of candidates that is “concluded as a matter of law
before the federal election day, with no act in law or in fact to take place on
the date chosen by Congress” clearly violated 2 U.S.C. § 7.85 Although the
Court rendered its decision based upon its reading of the plain meaning of
the statute, it added that its “judgment [was] buttressed by an appreciation
of Congress’s object ‘to remedy more than one evil arising from the
election of members of Congress occurring at different times in the
different States.’” 86 The Court noted:
As the sponsor of the original bill put it, Congress was concerned both
with the distortion of the voting process threatened when the results of an
early federal election in one State can influence later voting in other
States, and with the burden on citizens forced to turn out on two different
election days to make final selections of [members of Congress and
President of the United States] . . . . 87

Thus, according to Foster, an election to the United States Congress and
the United States Senate was required to be held on federal election day.
The election could not be concluded prior to that day.
C. What About Absentee Ballots and Early Voting?
Although Foster prohibits the conclusion of federal elections prior
to election day, commencing such elections before the first Tuesday after
the first Monday in November is a different matter. For over a century,
various states have permitted voting prior to election day through the use of
absentee voting; today, all states provide some form of this. 88 Congress

83. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 (2005).
84. Foster, 522 U.S. at 70 n.1.
85. Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added). The Court distinguished the Louisiana law from a
situation where there is a “failure to elect” a Representative on election day because no
candidate received a majority, thus triggering 2 U.S.C. § 8. Id.
86. Id. at 73 (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884)).
87. Id.
88. See generally Voting Integrity Project v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 2001).
“More than a century ago, some states began to allow absentee voting, and all states
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itself has authorized such early voting, 89 looks upon the practice of early
voting by absentee ballots “with favor,”90 and has “required absentee
voting [to be allowed] in certain circumstances.”91
States have also enacted “early voting” statutes that permit voters to visit
polling places before election day. Despite their similarity to state and
federal laws permitting or requiring absentee balloting, early voting
practices met initial challenges. A Texas early voting law granting voters
an unrestricted right to vote up to seventeen days early survived review by
the Fifth Circuit. 92 The court held that as long as Congressional elections
are “consummated” on the statutorily-imposed federal election day, then
early voting is permissible because “‘election’ meant ‘the combined actions
of voters and officials mean to make a final selection of an office holder[;]’
[a]llowing some voters to cast votes before election day does not
contravene the federal election statutes because the final selection is not
made before the federal election day.” 93
The court identified several important considerations. First, while Texas
allowed early voting, the polls were open on federal election day and no
election results were released until the votes were tabulated.94 Second, the
court noted parallels to the universal use of absentee voting by the states
that permit voters to cast ballots prior to federal election day but does not
hasten the conclusion of the election.95 Third, the court underscored the
importance of protecting voting rights, and noted that it could not
“conceive that Congress intended the federal election day statutes to have
the effect of impeding citizens in exercising their right to vote.” 96 Finally,
the early voting statute did not promote the “primary evils” that Congress
currently provide for it in some form.” Id. at 776 (citing Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Voting by
Mail, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1261-62 (1985)); see also Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128,
1131 (7th Cir. 2004). That court reviewed states’ absentee balloting procedures and noted
that some states found “that the drawbacks of absentee voting are so far outweighed by the
interest in increasing voter turnout that every registered voter should be allowed to vote by
absentee ballot.” Id. Oregon has gone the farthest, making all voting by mail; other states
balance concerns about fraud and turnout by permitting limited classes of voters to cast
absentee ballots. Id.
89. Voting Integrity Project, 199 F.3d at 776 n.79.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 777 (emphasis in original) (noting that the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, and other provisions
require states to provide and accept absentee ballots from certain classes of voters).
92. Id. at 776.
93. Id. (quoting Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 (1997)).
94. Id. at 775-76. In fact, the court noted, “Texas law makes it illegal for election
officers to reveal any election results before the polls close on election day.” Id. at 777.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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sought to discourage by creating a federal election day: “‘distortion of the
voting process [would be] threatened when the results of an early federal
election in one state can influence later voting in other States, and . . . the
burden on citizens forced to turn out on two different election days to make
final selections of federal officers in presidential election years . . . .’” 97
Thus, like absentee balloting, early voting procedures were deemed
permissible because the election is consummated on federal election day—
not before.
D. After Federal Election Day
As we have seen, therefore, courts developed a framework to analyze
when and how voters may cast ballots prior to federal election day. Under
certain limited circumstances, courts also have permitted voting for federal
officers after federal election day. In Georgia, the 1980 redistricting plan
required, pursuant to the Voting Rights Act, pre-clearance by the
Department of Justice or approval by a federal District Court. 98 Litigation
over the redistricting plan resulted in a ruling that the proposed
Congressional district lines violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.99
As election day approached, a controversy developed over whether the
elections should proceed as scheduled, based upon unlawful district
lines. 100 The court held that Georgia was not required to conduct
congressional elections on these flawed lines in its fourth and fifth districts
on November 2, 1982, the scheduled federal election day, and could hold
the vote afterward. 101 The court in Busbee construed the federal election
statute “to mean that where exigent circumstances arising prior to or on the
date established by [2 U.S.C. § 7] preclude holding an election on that date,
a state may postpone the election until the earliest practicable date.”102
Cognizant of its extraordinary holding and the irregularity of the
situation, the court took pains to address the State of Georgia’s objections.
Georgia’s primary argument claimed the court lacked authority to postpone
an election based on the district lines: federal law103 permits elections on
days other than federal election day if the office becomes vacant (upon the
death of the officeholder, for instance) but does not authorize postponing a

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. (quoting Foster, 522 U.S. at 73).
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2005).
Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 526.
Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 525.
2 U.S.C. § 8 (2005).
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federal election to a later date. 104 The State further argued that, because the
Congressional seats would remain occupied until the officeholders’ terms
expired on January 3, 1983 the statute created no authority to hold elections
for those offices prior thereto. 105
The court rejected the State’s arguments, holding that 2 U.S.C. § 8
provided that, if there were a “failure to elect” a Member of Congress on
election day, then the State could fix an alternative, later date for the
election. In doing so, the court acknowledged that although the statute’s
drafters could not have foreseen “a ‘failure to elect’ engendered by a
Section 5 injunction, interpreting that phrase as encompassing such a
failure does no violence to Congress’ intent.” 106 Pointedly, the court added
that “Congress did not expressly anticipate that a natural disaster might
necessitate a postponement, yet no one would seriously contend that
Section 7 would prevent a state from rescheduling its congressional
elections under such circumstances.” 107
Busbee was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court, 108 and
stands for the proposition that a federal election may be postponed by a
state under extraordinary circumstances. Although the court did not define
the parameters of such circumstances (besides illegal district lines), it left
the door open for the same relief under other, unanticipated situations, such
as a “natural disaster.” 109 Notwithstanding the federal statute requiring
federal elections to be held on a specified day, 110 “no one would seriously
contend” that “exigent circumstances” could prevent a state from
postponing a scheduled election. Despite its reference to natural disasters,
Busbee, more importantly, demonstrates that postponement does not
require a freak natural occurrence on or immediately preceding election
day like those experienced by the voters of Lewiston, Maine and
Washington County, Pennsylvania. The Busbee court’s injunction relied
on the principle that it is preferable to postpone an election than to hold an
illegal one.
Eleven years later, the United States District Court of Georgia expanded
this interpretation. In Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 111 the court, relying on
Busbee, held that an election for the United States Senate that was

104. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 525.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 526.
107. Id.
108. Busbee v. Smith, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
109. Id.
110. See 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2005).
111. Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 992 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1993).
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inconclusive on the scheduled federal election day could be concluded
three weeks later. At the time, Georgia law required candidates to receive a
majority of the votes cast. In the absence of a majority, the state required a
run-off election. Supporters of the candidate who won an initial plurality,
but lost in the run-off, commenced an action alleging that the run-off
election, held three weeks after federal election day, was void because it
contravened 2 U.S.C. § 7.
The court held that because no candidate had won a majority of the votes
cast on election day, the State of Georgia “fail[ed] to elect” a United States
Senator, citing the Busbee court’s recognition that “federal law
contemplates occasional departures from Section 7’s dictates.”112 The
court noted that a state could not by design create the “exigent”
circumstances required to circumvent the federal statute that requires sameday voting for Congress, 113 but that Georgia’s “majority vote” statute was
not such an improper design. “A plurality outcome in the general election
[on election day] is similar to an election postponed due to natural disaster
or voided due to fraud in that each is contemplated, yet beyond the state’s
ability to produce.” 114
Public Citizen, like Busbee, thus demonstrates a flexible approach to
extending elections beyond the federal statutory date. The decisions stand
for the proposition that exigent circumstances, even if not unforeseen,
allow a state, if not acting by design or fraud or in bad faith, to postpone or
allow a subsequent conclusion of a federal election. While the Supreme
Court of the United States has not expressly written on the subject, its
affirmance of Busbee adopts this as the law. This approach is consistent
with the few state cases described above where states have postponed local
elections as a result of exigent circumstances.
As with state or municipal elections, however, the federal context
similarly offers no concrete guidelines as to what constitutes an exigent
circumstance. While leaving such determinations to the wisdom of public
officials with oversight by the judiciary has apparently proved successful to
date, it remains troublesome that federal election statutes, like state and
local ones, are bereft of any required or suggested direction as to how to
define “exigent” or “extraordinary” for the purpose of postponing an
election. Indeed, there are also no federal procedures relating to the
implementation of postponed elections where some voters have already
cast their ballots, where only part of the affected Congressional district or

112. Id. (quoting Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 524-25).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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state has been impacted by the disaster, or whether to canvass votes already
cast in order to preserve their integrity. In short, although certain
circumstances permit legal postponements of federal elections, like their
state or local counterparts, these situations are fraught with ambiguities and
potential problems.
IV. The Presidency
Having reviewed how states may alter elections under extraordinary
circumstances, albeit with dubious authority to do so and without anything
approaching rigorous procedural protections, and having analyzed how
federal statutes govern the alteration of congressional election days, I come
to the question that prompted this inquiry. In the face of a terrorist attack
on the United States, can a scheduled presidential election be postponed,
and, if so, by whom and by what authority?
A devastating meteorological or other natural disaster is highly unlikely
to impact the entire United States all at once. The odds are even greater
that this could happen on election day in a presidential election year—or a
day or two before. Unfortunately, the odds of a terrorist attack affecting a
great part of the continental United States do not seem as unlikely. Had the
attack on September 11 been wholly successful, planes would have
crippled lower Manhattan and much of Washington D.C., including the
White House or Capitol Hill. 115 Reports of Al Qaeda’s original plan for
that attack called for ten planes to be hijacked and rammed into buildings in
as many cities, 116 certainly an event that could have crippled the United
States. Whatever successes there have been in the subsequent War on
Terror, there is no doubt of the desire of certain elements to attempt future
terrorist attacks against the United States. Indeed, during the 2004
presidential campaign, Republicans and Democrats alike warned that
“another terrorist attack” was “inevitable.” 117
It did not happen in 2004. Can it happen in 2008? In 2004, the Chair of
the United States Election Assistance Commission wrote to the Department
of Homeland Security discussing the idea of postponing the last
presidential election in case there was a terrorist attack and pointing out
that no agency or governmental body had authority to do so.118 Amidst the
resulting hue and cry, its attempt to prepare a plan even for this remote
115. Douglas Jehl & Daniel Johnston, Threats and Responses: The Hijackers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2004, at A1.
116. Id.
117. Calvin Sims, Poll Finds Most Americans Have Not Prepared for a Terrorist Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at A19.
118. See Could November Election be Delayed?, supra note 9.
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exigency was apparently shelved, 119 but the problem, although now out of
sight, has not been eliminated.
Perhaps the outcry against even proposing a plan in case the unthinkable
occurred was because Americans did not want to consider this as the
election approached. Couple that with an abiding distrust of a President
who ascended to the office through the Supreme Court’s Order stopping the
re-count in Florida, 120 and it became undesirable to think about
circumstances that might postpone the 2004 election. Indeed, the House of
Representatives, in a strongly worded Resolution, left no doubt about
where it stood. 121 The defiant statement, which passed on July 24, 2004 by
the overwhelming vote of 419-2, essentially warned potential terrorists of
American resolve: nothing was going to prevent our regularly scheduled
presidential elections from going forward.
The fact that Americans have reacted so negatively to a perfectly
appropriate attempt at preparedness is certainly explainable.
But,
especially after the terrorist attack in Madrid just a few days prior to its
March 2004 national elections, this ostrich-like defiance is not acceptable.
So what are our options? And what are the existing constraints?
A. The Electoral College System is State-Driven
The United States Constitution and federal statutes grant the several
states dominant decision-making authority in presidential elections. This is
consistent with and reflective of the primal political forces that shaped our
republic. The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal powerful
tensions between what were already traditional state prerogatives and a
nascent drive toward nationalism.
Nowhere was this predilection for state-driven governance more telling
than in the creation of two uniquely American institutions—the United
States Senate and the electoral college. The Founders grappled with the
creation of a chief executive for several months.122 They were deeply
divided as to whether there should be one person at the helm of the new
country or perhaps three, 123 as well as how long the executive’s term
should be and whether the office should be term-limited. 124 The thorniest

119. It is not wholly clear that exigency preparation did indeed cease. If the
administration continued to think about and plan for an election day attack, the public was
not apprised.
120. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
121. H.R. 728, 108th Cong. (2004).
122. See ELLIS, supra note 67, at 63-96.
123. See id. at 31-34.
124. See id. at 97-100.
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issue they confronted, however, was how the executive should be selected.
Should he be chosen by the governors of the various states, elected by
Congress, or directly voted upon by the people? 125
The idea of an “electoral college” was raised numerous times during the
debates, only to be repeatedly defeated.126 The college was originally
envisioned as consisting of persons who were accomplished and respected,
but the idea did not garner much support. 127 Finally, after several hot
summer months in Philadelphia, and after the Connecticut compromise
resulted in the creation of a House of Representatives and Senate, the idea
seemed to catch hold. 128 Resistant to a direct election, and worried about
the executive’s dependence on the Congress if it chose him, the Founders
chose a third way—a “college” of electors whose number would neatly
reflect the total of Congressmen and Senators, but to avoid legislative
control, would not include members from either body. 129 The Convention
ensured local control over the process by mandating that the states would
decide who became members of the electoral college and how they were to
be selected.
Indeed, if there were any doubt about the supremacy of the states in the
presidential election process, it was put to rest by the Supreme Court
decision in McPherson v. Blacker. 130 In McPherson, the Court affirmed
the Michigan Supreme Court’s dismissal of a challenge to that state’s
procedure for choosing presidential electors. Pursuant to 1891 Michigan
legislation, presidential electors consisted of a combination of eleven
“district” electors, chosen by the voters of their respective districts, as well
as a “western district at-large” elector and an “eastern district at-large”
elector, each chosen by the voters of designated districts in their part of the
state. 131 The scheme was challenged based upon the claim that presidential
electors had to be elected on a general, statewide ticket. 132
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution gives the states absolute
authority to decide how presidential electors were to be chosen.133 The
Court then gave a brief recounting of states’ various methods in several
presidential elections, including direct selection by the state legislature

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 63-66.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 64-65.
146 U.S. 1 (1892).
Id. at 4-7.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 34.
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(sometimes by concurrent ballot, other times in joint session); by popular
vote on a general, state-wide ticket: by popular vote on a district-by-district
basis; by popular vote on a mixed general ticket and district voting system;
and by popular vote on a district-by-district election of electors, who, in
turn, elected at-large electors. 134 The Court noted that, although there had
been efforts to amend the Constitution to require the various states to have
a “uniform mode of choice,” none had succeeded.135
Furthermore, although the Court observed that the political system did
not reflect the Founders’ apparent desire to have presidential electors
“exercise a reasonable independence and fair judgment in the selection of
the chief executive” because electors “were [now] chosen simply to register
the will of the appointing power in [support] of a particular candidate,”136
the MacPherson Court could find “no reason for holding that the power
confided to the states by the constitution ha[d] ceased to exist because the
operation of the system had not fully realized the hopes for those by whom
it was created.” 137
In short, the Supreme Court left no doubt whatsoever that, absent an
amendment to the United States Constitution, the electoral college is, was,
and always will be a state-driven system, despite its singularly unique
function of electing a national leader.
B. Shackled By Our History and Jurisprudence
Given our state-driven election system, it is not surprising that even in
the two presidential elections that can be fairly characterized as long,
drawn-out constitutional crises, the outcomes, though rendered by national
institutions, were determined by state law, thus reinforcing our republic’s
powerful historical preference for avoiding a national approach to a
presidential election crisis. This was true in 1876, and again in 2000.
1. 1876 and the Electoral Count Act
The 1876 Tilden-Hayes election was an electoral college deadlock. It
was fairly clear that Democrat Samuel J. Tilden, Governor of New York,
had a majority of the popular vote. 138 What was not clear was the winner

134. Id. at 33.
135. Id. at 34-35.
136. Id. at 36.
137. Id.
138. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION
99 (2004).
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of the electoral vote.139 There were four states that held the balance of
power: Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Oregon. In Florida, which
reprised its pivotal role in presidential elections some 125 years later, about
50,000 votes had been cast. 140 Votes were reported by the various counties
to a State Canvassing Board, and, on the “face of the returns,” Tilden led
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes by “only 80-some votes.” 141 The
Canvassing Board, however, which had two Republicans and one
Democrat, had the authority and “discretion to exclude returns that were
‘irregular, false, or fraudulent.’” 142 Exercising this discretion, sometimes
unanimously and sometimes by a 2-1 vote along party lines, the
Canvassing Board concluded that Hayes had won the state by forty-five
votes. 143
In Louisiana, Tilden appeared to have won the state by between 8000
and 9000 votes. 144 The State Returning Board, which had the ultimate
decision-making authority as to the victor, was “not one to inspire
confidence in the Democrats.” 145 The law required that the Returning
Board have five members with both parties represented, but there was only
one Democrat on the Board, and he resigned prior to the 1876 election.146
The president of the Board had been Governor of Louisiana during
Reconstruction, but had been removed as governor “for dishonesty.” 147 He
remained on the Returning Board, however, and his three Republican
colleagues were likewise “not held in high regard by impartial
observers.” 148 After taking testimony during twelve public sessions, the
Board “rejected more than 13,000 Democratic [ballots]” and only 2500
Republican votes. 149 Unsurprisingly, Hayes was declared the winner.
South Carolina saw “illegal voting by both white Democrats and black
Republicans.” 150 The Board of Canvassers certified Hayes as the
winner. 151 The courts held the members of the Board in contempt, fined

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 98.
Id. at 104.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id. at 109.
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them, and locked them up in the county jail.152 Nevertheless, Hayes
prevailed.
It was accepted by both sides that the presidential electors pledged to
Hayes had won in Oregon. 153 One of the Republican electors, however,
was not eligible to serve because he was a “fourth-class postmaster and
received an annual salary of $268.” 154 There was no disagreement about
the postmaster’s ineligibility, but Democrats and Republicans differed on
how to interpret the state law governing how vacancies were to be filled.
Republicans urged that the remaining electors should choose a
replacement.155 This, of course, would have resulted in another Republican
elector. Democrats, on the other hand, argued that the candidate for elector
with the next highest vote total should be elected.156 This interpretation
would have led to another vote for Tilden.
Needless to say, each presidential candidate needed every vote he could
get. With respect to Florida and Louisiana, “the Democrats could
forcefully argue that a large part of the public thought that Tilden had
carried both of the states, and he should not lose them both on what fairly
might be thought to be the actions of politically biased Republican
returning boards.” 157 In Oregon, however, the Democratic position was
“clearly contrary to state law.” 158 Thus, both sides were “playing a noholds-barred game.” 159 Although each party was exploiting these states’
laws to its own advantage, the Republicans were more effective in
controlling the election machinery, and thus were able to deliver their
electoral votes to their standard-bearer, Rutherford B. Hayes.
While the House of Representatives certainly could have constitutionally
elected the president because no candidate appeared to have won an
electoral college majority, 160 the prevailing uncertainty of the results in
these four states, the almost certain existence of voting fraud, and the
presence of violence on the streets by angry partisans, contributed to a very
unstable political situation. Thus, members of Congress were apparently
reluctant to exercise their constitutional prerogative to elect a president as

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 110; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (prohibiting any “person holding an
office of trust or profit under the United States” from serving as a presidential elector).
155. REHNQUIST, supra note 140, at 110.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 112.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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their forebears had done in earlier times.161 Consequently, they created an
ad hoc solution, which acted as a buffer to shield them from a decision that
was bound to be unpopular: a special Electoral Commission comprising of
five congressional Democrats, five congressional Republicans, and five
Supreme Court Justices. 162 Ultimately, this Commission rendered a
decision, which Congress ratified: Hayes was elected, and pledged to serve
only one term (he was mocked throughout his tenure as “Rutherfraud”
Hayes). Tilden conceded and the republic’s business went forward.163
Succession in the presidency was uninterrupted, and political stability of a
sort existed.
As a result of this presidential crisis, however, Congress enacted the
Electoral Count Act, which codified a variety of procedures and deadlines
to deal with the kind of uncertainty that existed in 1876 and avoid another
ad hoc solution. One of the reforms is the “Safe Harbor Provision” found
in 3 U.S.C. § 5: 164
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or
contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State,
by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have
been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the
electors, such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said
day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors,
shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as
provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the
ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is concerned.

This provision essentially directs states to establish laws and procedures to
determine controversies and contests relating to the casting and counting of
votes for presidential electors. So long as the state follows its procedures
in a timely manner, the statute renders the state’s judicial or regulatory
determination of the outcome dispositive, and not subject to further
161. The last time the House determined the outcome of a presidential election was in
1824 when John Quincy Adams defeated Andrew Jackson. See ELLIS, supra note 67, at
115.
162. See REHNQUIST, supra note 140, at 5.
163. Several months after the Commission selected Hayes as president, Governor Tilden
was addressing a group of supporters at a political gathering in New York City. Responding
to their obvious upset at the results of the election, and the calls in some quarters for resort
to arms, Tilden sought to reassure them: “If my voice could reach throughout our country
and be heard in its remotest hamlet, I would say: Be of good cheer. The Republic will live.
The institutions of our fathers are not to expire in shame.” Id. at 210 (quoting ALEXANDER
CLARENCE FLICK, SAMUEL JONES TILDEN 412 (1963)).
164. (2005).
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challenge by Congress. Thus, if the state meets the deadline, its slate of
electors reside in a “safe harbor,” untouchable by those counting the
electoral votes, the Congress.
While this might appear to be couched in terms of Congressional power
with regard to the counting of electoral votes, it actually reinforces the
dominance of the states—they would dispose of vote challenges according
to their own laws, and, if done by a certain date, Congress’s role in
counting the electoral votes would be essentially ministerial. Indeed, even
if the dispute occurs in a state whose electoral votes will determine the
overall outcome of the election, if the state resolves the controversy
according to laws put in place prior to federal election day, that decision is
final, and Congress is off the hook.
Similarly, if there are competing slates of electors, the Electoral Count
Act provides for a state-driven solution. 165 While Congress resolves
controversies as to which slate represents the state’s electoral votes, the
decision is made based upon the laws of the state in question.166 There is
no federal standard controlling how electors are elected (presuming, of
course, that they are actually elected), or how the votes electing them are to
be cast or counted. So even if the Reform Act had been in effect in 1876,
Congress would have done what the Commission did—analyze the vote
totals pursuant to the state laws of Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, and
Oregon, each of which was different.
But it gets better. If both houses of Congress do not agree on how to
interpret state law when deciding between or among competing slates of
electors, then Congress simply looks to the governor of that state: “[I]f the
two Houses shall disagree in respect of the counting of such votes, then,
and in that case, the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have
been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be
counted.” 167 Put another way, if Congress deadlocks, it is up to the
governor to decide who won his or her state’s electoral vote, and Congress
must defer to that determination.
Thus, the federal statute governing presidential elections, enacted on the
heels of the 1876 presidential imbroglio and meant to avoid another TildenHayes situation, was, despite the corrupting impact state proceedings had
on the outcome, guided by state laws and prerogatives. For better or worse,
this was consistent with, and continued, our historical tradition.

165. See generally 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2005).
166. Id. “[T]he two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide [which] is
supported by the decision of such State so authorized by its law . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id.
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2. 2000, HAVA, and 2004

One hundred and twenty-five years after the Tilden-Hayes crisis and the
passage of the Electoral Count Act, another presidential election crisis
arose. This time the dispute was governed by a statutory framework with
time lines and procedures; an ad hoc institution would not be required to
settle whether Governor Bush or Vice President Gore had won the
presidency.
Unlike the Tilden-Hayes re-canvass, the whole world could watch the
Bush-Gore aftermath, but as in 1876, it was state law that determined the
outcome. Indeed, under Florida law in 2000, the sixty-seven counties’
canvassing boards had independent authority to decide whether a voter had
actually cast a ballot for president, and for whom. 168 Guided by a state law
that directed canvassers to analyze the “intent of the voter,” each board
inspected punch cards with hanging chads, dimpled chads, and the like.169
Unfortunately, the Florida legislature had not spelled out what criteria
ought to be employed in this deliberative process, as had the state of Texas,
for example. 170 Thus, the various boards relied on their own respective
interpretations of the “intent of the voter” statute.171 Consequently, for
example, the standard used by election personnel in Broward County was
different than in Dade or Volusia County. Worse, the standard within some
counties seemed to change from one day to the next.172
As such, though this was about electing the President of the United
States, the decision-making process for thirty-six days after election day
was centered on how to count votes under Florida law. And even though
the United States Supreme Court eventually ruled that the recount
procedure violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, Governor Bush’s 537 winning margin had nevertheless been
cast and re-canvassed under Florida law. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
decision not to direct the recount process to go forward pursuant to
procedures that could pass constitutional muster was also based upon
Florida law (at least, according to the Supreme Court’s view): 173 the Court
168. ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL
BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 34 (2001).
169. Id. at 32.
170. Id. at 35-38. An irony of how the Bush and Gore forces attempted to interpret
Florida’s “intent of the voter” statute was how each sought to refer to or seek distance from
the Texas law, the only analogous statute in the union that provided indicia of intent with
great specificity. That law, of course, had been signed by then-Governor George W. Bush.
Id. at 36.
171. Id. at 34.
172. Id. at 71-71.
173. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 98, 110-11 (2000).
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decided not to remand and permit Florida to fashion acceptable recount
rules because it interpreted state law as requiring a final count in time to be
impervious to Congressional challenge under 3 U.S.C. § 5. 174 Thus, the
Supreme Court concluded that Florida’s desire to have its electoral votes
unchallenged in Congress trumped a complete, accurate, and
constitutionally acceptable recount under Florida law. Because the Court
rendered its decision on December 12, 2000, 175 the “safe harbor” date
under 3 U.S.C § 5 that permitted Florida’s presidential electoral college
slate to be presumptively free from challenge by the House of
Representatives, the clock had simply run out for Florida to promulgate a
constitutionally acceptable recount procedure. Put another way, the United
States Supreme Court held that the State of Florida’s express desire to have
its delegation unchallengeable overrode any federal interest in having a
constitutional standard of vote-counting.
Once again, a national institution, this time the venerable Supreme Court
like the extra-constitutional Electoral Commission of 1877, decided a
presidential election, and, again, did so based upon its interpretation of
state law. One may question the Supreme Court’s motives or even its
interpretation of state law as it pertained to Florida’s alleged preference for
a finalized count to qualify for safe harbor protection, 176 but there is no
denying the fact that the Supreme Court rendered a decision based upon its
interpretation of state law, even though the result determined a presidential
election.
In light of the 2000 voting problems, Congress enacted the Help
America Vote Act (“HAVA”). 177 One might have assumed that given the
vote counting crisis in Florida, and the political firestorm that it created,
Congress might have legislated sweeping reforms of the way presidents are
elected. Consistent with and reflective of our state-driven electoral system,
however, the major election reforms pertaining to presidential and other
federal elections were largely left to the states.
For example, because so many voters were turned away in 2000 as a
result of questions about their eligibility, HAVA mandated the use of
“provisional ballots” that allow a person to cast a ballot subject to later
verification of registration. 178 But the use, design, method of distribution,

174. (2005); Bush, 531 U.S. at 110-11.
175. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 110-11.
176. See GREENE, supra note 171, at 122-33. Professor Greene argues that the Supreme
Court “goofed” in this regard. Id. at 122.
177. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2005).
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and counting of provisional ballots would be dictated by state election
laws. 179 Similarly, responding to the punch card debacle, HAVA provides
federal grants for new voting technologies.180 Here, too, the states retained
jurisdiction; each state may decide what kind of voting system to purchase
and use. 181 One of the most troubling aspects of the 2000 Florida voting
process was that there were different technologies throughout the state, and
each system had its own error rate. 182 Nevertheless, HAVA not only
permits different states to use different voting technologies for a
presidential election, but also allows a state to use different systems in its
several counties. 183 As a result, we saw in 2004 a variety of voting systems
throughout the country, with most states lacking a uniform system even
within their own borders. 184
In addition to different voting technologies, other election features vary
among the states, including the existence and implementation of re-count
statutes; the eligibility of felons; the identification voters need at polling
places; and registration procedures and deadlines.185 In short, a crazy quilt
of decentralized election laws dictates how presidential electors are elected,
and thus who the winner is in the election of inarguably the most powerful
person on the planet.
Anticipating that the various state laws and directives might result in
adverse results, numerous groups commenced lawsuits in 2004 prior to
election day seeking orders that would force states to implement their
procedures in a manner that broadened the franchise—in effect, to

179. Id. § 15482(a)(4).
180. See id. § 15301.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Charles Stewart III, Caltech/MIT Voting Tech.
Project, Residual Votes Attributable to Technology, 67 POL. 365 (2001) (analyzing the
relative effectiveness of various voting technologies and noting that replacing punchcard
ballots with optically scanned-ballots would have resulted in 500,000 more countable votes
for president in 2000).
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(6) (2005).
184. See The e-Book On Election Law: An Online Reference Guide, at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part4/equipment_machines.html (last visited
Jun. 10, 2005) (listing the voting technologies used in every state).
185. See, e.g., Voting Rights for Citizens with Felony Convictions, at http://www.demosusa.org/page15.cfm (last visited May 14, 2005); Recounts and Other Remedies, at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part5/procedures_recount (last visited May 14,
2005);
Provisional
balloting
nationwide,
at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part5/provisional02.html (last visited May 14,
2005); Crashing the Parties: A New Report from The Century Foundation on the Nader
Campaign and the Debate over Ballot Access, The Century Foundation (Sept. 20, 2004),
available at www.tcf.org.
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federalize voting procedures consistent with the alleged intent of HAVA. 186
Arguing generally that HAVA was enacted to increase voting, not to limit
it, various plaintiffs urged the courts, for example, to expand the use of
provisional ballots. But, in two of the most hotly contested states in the
2004 election, Ohio and Florida, the courts ruled that, despite the general
thrust of HAVA, the votes for presidential electors, provisional ballots
included, must be counted in conformity with state law. 187
Following the 2004 election and the numerous court rulings placing
HAVA implementation squarely with the states, some efforts were
commenced to mitigate state-driven shackles and to implement broader,
nationalized reform. For example, legislation has been introduced in the
United States Congress that would preempt state law in a number of
significant areas, including felon enfranchisement, verifiable paper trails,
presumptively acceptable voter registrations, and same day registration. 188
Still, the basic foundational premise among many experts and
commentators remains 189 that American presidential elections are state
affairs, administered and regulated by each of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia. It seems, then, after almost two hundred and twenty
years since the birth of the republic, the more things change, the more they
stay the same.
C. The Constitutional and Statutory Scheme
Although there is an historical and statutory preference for a state-driven
election system, our constitutional framework does provide an overlay of
Congressional power. The constitutional provision relating to the election

186. See, e.g., American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations v.
Hood, 885 So.2d 373 (Fla. 2004); Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Ohio Democratic
Party, 339 F. Supp. 2d 975 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Bay County Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F.
Supp. 2d 404 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
187. Id.
188. See generally Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S.450, 109th Cong. (2005).
189. In March 2005, prominent election lawyers and academics from both sides of the
aisle assembled as The Century Foundation’s Post-2004 Working Group on Election
Reform. Despite the expertise of the individuals involved, the group’s mission does not
appear to challenge the state-driven framework:
The group will assess the key provisions of HAVA, analyze the ways in which
they were implemented in 2004, and provide guidelines for how they ought to be
implemented by the states in the future. In addition, the working group will
analyze how states are preparing to comply with HAVA requirements . . . [and]
provide the best policy options for states to meet these mandates . . . .
Press Release, Century Foundation, The Century Group Assembles Working Group to Help
States
Improve
Voting
Process
(Mar.
23,
2005),
available
at
http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=PR&pubid=52.
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of president provides that “Congress may determine the Time of chusing
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day
shall be the same throughout the United States[,]” 190 and that “[e]ach state
shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors.” 191 The states were thereby given the power to
determine how to choose electors who will select the President of the
United States, but Congress was given the authority to make two choices:
first, to decide whether to enact legislation as to when presidential electors
would be chosen; second, to decide whether to enact legislation as to when
the presidential electors would cast their ballots for president. The
constitution, therefore, requires only that the members of the electoral
college cast their ballots for president on the same day. Congress, on the
other hand, may alter “election day” as it sees fit. Indeed, we have already
seen that, until 1845, states selected their electors at different times. In that
year, Congress enacted legislation directing when voters must cast ballots
for presidential electors: “The electors of President and Vice President
shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first
Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a
President and Vice President.” 192 In fact, even the federal statute that
includes a requirement for the election of presidential electors on the same
day includes another provision that acknowledges the possibility of
multiple-day voting. The relevant statute, 3 U.S.C § 2, includes a “savings
clause”: “Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of
choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by
law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as
the legislature of such State may direct.” 193 Had the constitution required
that Congress direct each state to hold elections for the electoral college on
the same day, it could not have enacted the savings clause.
Moreover, on one occasion, Congress expressly granted states the power
to elect presidential electors over several days. In the early 1870s, the
United States enacted electoral reforms amidst the political turmoil from

190. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
191. Id. Congress was not required by the Constitution to compel each state to choose its
electors on the same day—only the day of voting by the electors. A careful reading of
Article II, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution reveals that the second clause, prescribing
the “same throughout the United States,” refers to and modifies the “Day” on which the
presidential electors cast their ballots for president—not the “Time” when the people or the
state legislatures elect the presidential electors. Congress was, therefore, compelled to set
the same day for the presidential electors to elect a president and vice president, but not the
same day for choosing the electors.
192. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2005).
193. 3 U.S.C. § 2.
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ongoing Reconstruction. 194 The legislation included one extraordinary
exception: for the 1872 presidential election only, if a state so chose, its
voters were permitted to cast ballots for presidential electors for “the
number of days required.” 195 This, too, would have been impossible if the
constitution required same-day voting for presidential elections.
Thus, despite our historical tradition of voters casting ballots for
presidential electors on a uniform federal election day (albeit with an
increasing trend by states to allow early voting and more liberal absentee
balloting), as well as our constitutional deference to state decision-making
in electoral matters, our history and constitutional framework gives
Congress the right to alter that practice should the need arise. Congress
may, consistent with our history and federal statutes, allow the states to
make the decision as to whether to take advantage of that option—as it did
in 1872. Or, even if Congress is loath to permanently “nationalize” our
presidential elections, should a uniquely national crisis erupt, Congress has
the power and could require the states to employ alternative dates and
procedures for voting for the electoral college.
V. CAN CONGRESS STEP UP TO THE PLATE ON TERRORISM?
Given Congress’s power to legislate a response to the potential chaos
that a terrorist attack can have on a presidential election, the pertinent
question remains: Does Congress have the political will to legislate
national electoral reform and address the unthinkable? To answer a
question with another question: Can Congress afford not to?
A. Failing to Act is No Longer an Option
As the House Resolution passed on July 24, 2004 demonstrates, there is
a strong sense by governmental officials that terrorists must not be
permitted to interfere with our way of life, and, in particular, our electoral
process. It is extraordinary that the House of Representatives nearly
unanimously concluded that no federal election should ever be postponed
in case of an attack. One can interpret this defiant Resolution in many
ways, but it must be understood in context. A review of related legislation
demonstrates that there is not a total unwillingness to “think the
unthinkable.” After all, in the very next session, the House passed a bill to
permit a relatively speedy process for special elections to the House in the
event of a massive killing of one hundred or more members of Congress.196
194. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3408 (1872)).
195. Id.
196. See Continuity in Representation Act of 2004, H.R. 2844, 108th Cong. § 2(b)(4)(A)
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And legislation has been introduced to allow a president-elect to
recommend potential national security and cabinet level appointees so that
the Senate may confirm them prior to or immediately upon the new
president taking office.197 This proposal is intended to preserve “continuity
of governmental operations in the wake of a catastrophic terrorist attack.”
198

We have seen that, while it is constitutionally a state prerogative to
choose the method of electing presidential electors, Congress can and did
exercise its choice to set the date of when electors are chosen. It did so in
the 1840s, and with one exception in 1872, has required that all states
choose the electors on the same day. Thus, irrespective of how the electors
are chosen, the entire country consummates its voting for the electoral
college on one day. Moreover, as we have also seen, when an election for
Congress has not been concluded on election day, the federal statute’s
“savings clause” has permitted, and courts have directed, post-election day
voting. There is an analogous savings clause for the electoral college.
Though it has never been invoked, Congress has delegated to the states the
same power to establish procedures for post-election day voting in
presidential elections 199 as it has in Congressional elections. 200 There is,
therefore, no reason that the states could not do so should exigent
circumstances prevent the conclusion of voting for presidential electors on
election day.
No state, however, has used its authority to legislate parameters as to
when or how to exercise such power should the need arise. This omission
may have been unremarkable prior to September 11, but the continuing
failure after the attack is, at the very least, surprising. Were there to be an
attack on or right before a presidential election, the affected states would
presumably exercise their powers under 3 U.S.C. § 2 by relying upon
general plenary powers relating to emergencies. Indeed, in its Resolution
against the postponing of a federal election in the face of a terrorist attack,
the House of Representative said that “there is no reason to believe that the
men and women who administer elections in jurisdictions across the nation
would be incapable of determining how to react to a terrorist attack.” 201
But, all good intentions aside, in the absence of any preemptive federal
legislation as to how to proceed under these circumstances, some states

(2004).
197. H.R. Res. 775, 108th Cong. (2004).
198. Id.
199. See 3 U.S.C. § 2 (2005).
200. See 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2005).
201. H.R. 728, 108th Cong. (2004).
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might choose to suspend the election during an emergency and some might
not. If there is another attack in the financial center of New York City on
election day, for example, the governor of Ohio may determine that there is
no reason to suspend voting in his state. On the other hand, if Amtrak
trains are blown up outside Cleveland, Miami, Atlanta, and Las Vegas,
would the governors of New York and California, assuming they had the
powers to make the decision, feel comfortable insisting that the voting in
their states proceed? What criteria would each of these governors rely
upon in making their decision?
If an attack were leveled against only New York and Washington, D.C.,
which together total only thirty-six electoral college votes, would the
remaining states continue the election, and if an electoral majority were
reached, would it count? A majority could be obtained without those
traditionally Democratic votes, but could voters from New York and D.C.
persuade a federal court to enjoin the casting of ballots by presidential
electors in the remaining state capitols? New York and D.C. would have
several weeks (from the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November
until the second Wednesday in December) to complete the postponed
election. But if they were not able to, because all voting records in
Democratic New York City were destroyed, and a Republican state
legislature refused to permit same-day registration, could New York
successfully enjoin the casting of the ballots by the electoral college in
December on the ground that all presidential electors were constitutionally
required to vote on the same day? Unfortunately, even in the face of
another attack on the United States, partisan politics might come into play.
Substitute Florida in 2000 for the New York and D.C. example. Assume
terrorists attack polling sites in Miami Beach, Ft. Lauderdale, and Boca
Raton by suicide bombers on election day. Governor Jeb Bush inspects the
damage where poll workers are killed and all registration records are
incinerated. He personally visits the many condo communities where lives
have been lost, and demonstrates his deep and heartfelt sympathies for the
survivors. But he also allows the presidential election to proceed in the rest
of the state. After the polls close, the electoral college vote in the rest of
the nation is tight as a drum, with neither side winning a majority and
Florida deciding the outcome. When the votes are finally counted in
Florida (including those that were cast early in the morning in the three
decimated cities), then-Governor George Bush wins Florida by some
20,000 votes. Perhaps Jeb Bush considers postponing the election in the
three affected counties, but decides that the re-creation of registration
records would take at least six months, and does not think that the country
could wait to resolve the presidential election. Accordingly, he certifies the
Republican slate of electors pledged to his brother.
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Open to question is whether Jeb Bush would have had the authority to
continue the election in the rest of the state? One might argue that the
Pennsylvania flooding case 202 supports his position. One might also argue
that the absence of any specific federal or state law regarding exigent
circumstances in a presidential election prevents him from halting the
election in the rest of the state. On the other hand, could the Democrats
fairly claim that that the voters of Florida had “failed to elect” their
presidential electors in that three counties had lost their opportunity to
vote? And, if so, could the balloting in the various state capitols on
December 18, 2000 be enjoined if destroyed voting records prevented a
postponed election day so soon after the attack?
If the hypothetical terrorist attack occurred in Republican-leaning
counties rather than in the Democratic-leaning communities as suggested
above, could Governor Bush postpone the election in those affected
counties while the rest of the state continued to vote? Based upon the
Pennsylvania case, perhaps he could, but political considerations might
very well persuade him to call off the election in the entire state, and then
the Republicans might be the ones seeking to enjoin the electoral college
vote. The issue, of course, is whether it is possible to eliminate an
outcome-determinative political calculation in such decision-making, or is
it simply inevitable for politics to come into play?
The problem with these scenarios, of course, is that decisions of whether
and how to respond to an exigent circumstance, even one as catastrophic
and far-reaching as an attack on the homeland during a presidential
election, are left to the states, with no clear federal or state guidelines.
It gets worse. If these hypotheticals are modified to include attacks in
several states, some states might choose to postpone the election in part of
a state, but not in other parts of the state. Some may choose to postpone
the voting throughout the state. Some may choose to simply accept the
vote totals without completed voting in the damaged areas. Unless various
states chose to consult and agree, the adopted procedures could vary, and
even the dates of postponed election days may not be the same from state
to state.
Obviously, we are indeed fortunate that these “nightmare scenarios”
have not occurred. The closest we have come is the postponed mayoral
election in New York City on September 11, 2001. If an attack disrupted a
future presidential election, the chances of litigation would almost certainly
be higher. After all, the shock and surprise of another attack would not be

202. See generally In re General Election—1985, 531 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1987); supra Part
II.B.
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as great as it was on September 11; and the stakes and partisan emotions
could not be more intense than during a race for the White House.
While it is certainly understandable, from a political and emotional
perspective, for Congress to take a defiant stand against the possibility of
an attack against our electoral process, one need not be an alarmist to
conclude that it is quite irresponsible not to act prophylactially. As a
constitutional matter, Congress has the authority to set the date of the
voting and has done so in a manner that acknowledges the possibility that
voting on election day might not be complete. Instead of permitting the
state-driven electoral system to dictate what would happen in the event of a
crisis—which could result in disparate solutions by the affected states, and
a possible constitutional crisis surrounding the composition of whatever
electoral college was elected—Congress should exercise its authority as
well as its responsibility to enact a uniform set of procedures to determine
when and how to proceed in the face of extraordinarily exigent
circumstances such as a terrorist attack on or immediately before a
presidential election.
There is no question that we are burdened by our history. For Congress
to act in this way would no doubt be viewed as a break from our long
tradition of delegating these issues to states, but the potential constitutional
chaos that might ensue requires a new approach. The chance of terrorism
or a major natural disaster occurring on or immediately before our
quadrennial election day is extremely remote, but prudence dictates action.
B. The Time is Ripe; Some Suggestions
A special Congressional task force should be appointed to study the
issue. Hearings should be convened, inviting constitutional and election
law scholars, state and federal elected officials, political scientists, state
election administrators, and citizens. Legislation should be proposed and
debated.
The time is ripe. We have recovered from September 11, 2001, and held
a presidential election. Significantly, the next presidential election will
have no incumbent running for re-election, and no vice president seeking
the presidency. As such, the tension of partisanship, ever present when
formulating electoral procedures, is somewhat reduced. And, of course, it
is better to design rules and guidelines in the absence of emergency or
necessity.
There is no talismanic solution, but I have several suggestions.
1. Congressional Action
When the President of the United States gives the State of the Union to a
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joint session of Congress each January, at least one cabinet Secretary stays
away to ensure presidential succession should there be a massive attack on
the Capitol. Obviously, the odds of this occurring are marginal, but caution
dictates preparedness to ensure continuity of our government.
Similarly, Congress should, every four years, appoint an Extraordinary
Presidential Election Contingencies Committee. Its members would
consist of representatives of the candidates of the major parties and any
independent candidate or minor party polling at least ten percent of the
popular vote or qualifying for matching campaign funds. Anticipating
extraordinarily exigent circumstances such as a terrorist attack or a
widespread natural disaster on or immediately preceding election day, this
Committee would set certain guidelines as to how to proceed. Should such
an attack occur, the Committee would immediately decide whether the
election should go forward, if any state or part thereof should postpone its
voting, and, if so, when, and any other relevant procedural matters. The
Committee would be directed to consult with the governors of the various
affected states, and the presidential and vice presidential candidates.
This kind of Committee’s biggest advantage is its centralized
authority—or national perspective—a single body with decision-making
authority should the unthinkable occur. The various candidates’ interests
would be taken into account, and, theoretically, the higher national interest
would be determinative. The election would not rely upon various states
making potentially contradictory decisions based upon a hodge-podge of
state laws. The drawback is that the Committee is similar to the extra-legal
Electoral Commission Congress appointed to resolve the Tilden-Hayes
election in 1876.
Better yet, then, rather than having Congress delegating its authority on
such a weighty and extraordinary matter to an ad hoc group reminiscent of
the 1876 Commission, Congress could appoint its own bipartisan
leadership as the Committee. In this case, Congress would be affirmatively
assuming responsibility for the timing and procedures of the presidential
election during extraordinarily exigent circumstances. This would be
preferable because the United States Congress would be assuming its
historical and constitutional role in electing the president and vice president
of the United States, albeit under different circumstances than our Founders
contemplated. Yet Americans would no doubt accept the authority and
competence of the Congress to exercise this power.
Better still, Congress ought to enact permanent procedures that address
this exigency, providing guidelines as to how decisions should be made,
and by whom. As such, Congress would be taking the initiative and
establishing a national response to a national emergency, rather than
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leaving the constitutional crisis to be “managed” by the various states.
2. Guidelines
If and when Congress decides to assume its responsibilities regarding a
possible terrorist attack on the United States during or immediately
preceding a presidential election, it should set forth specific guidelines as to
how to proceed. Just as Congress grappled with what ultimately became
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution regarding issues of a
disabled president and vacancies in the office of vice presidency, here, too,
a legislative solution will not come easily or quickly. Nevertheless, there
are certain issues that must be addressed.
Here are some suggestions to guide decision-making, offered as model
legislation:
(a) the election for presidential electors should be postponed only in
those counties in a state where extraordinary exigent circumstances have
interfered with the voting process;
(b) for the purpose of this guideline, “interfered with the voting process”
should include, but not be limited to:
(i) destruction of voting machine(s), registration rolls, or ballots
cast;
(ii) prevention of voters’ access to polling site(s);
(iii) widespread loss of communication;
(iv) compromised integrity of polling site(s), or
(v) unsafe conditions.
(c) should the voting of a county be postponed, only those voters whose
ballots have been compromised should be allowed to cast a new vote at the
postponed election date; all votes that have been cast prior to the
postponement of an election, as long as the integrity of the ballot has not
been compromised, should be considered inviolate;
(d) should the voting of a county be postponed, there should be no
canvassing of the ballots of that state for president or any other public
office until all votes are cast at the postponed election; further, in the states
where the election is not postponed, there should be no canvassing of the
ballots for president or any other public office until the votes are all cast at
the postponed election in the states that are affected; and,
(e) all voting equipment and all votes cast, whether in counties where the
election is postponed or in other counties in the affected state where voting
is postponed, as well as in unaffected states, should, at the close of the polls
on election day, be impounded and placed under the jurisdiction of the
highest court of the state or their representatives until all postponed election
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day voting is completed.
Although I believe that these suggestions are fair and sensible, they are
merely a starting point for Congress, and, I hope, an incentive for Congress
to begin the process of enacting a national procedure to protect our
electoral system.

CONCLUSION
If the attack on the World Trade Center had occurred ten months earlier,
on November 7, 2000, the United States would have been totally
unprepared as to whether or how to conduct the presidential election of
2000. When there was an attack during the New York City Mayoral
primary election in 2001, the unique shock of the event dwarfed any
concern about postponing that election or the procedures to be followed.
Having already lived through that trauma, however, and having watched
Spain’s voters become overwhelmed by a terrorist attack immediately
before its national election, Americans would no doubt find it unacceptable
should such an attack disrupt a presidential election and create the kind of
chaotic constitutional crisis that is likely to occur without any plan in place.
Congress has the power and responsibility to fix this. It should.

